Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung by Meyer Matthew

Author:Meyer, Matthew
Language: deu
Format: epub
Publisher: De Gruyter
Published: 2014-05-12T16:00:00+00:00

4.6 From Homo Mensura to the Secret Doctrines of Heraclitus

Thus far, I have attempted to detail the transition from (T) to (P). In so doing, I have detailed the way in which the Protagorean position eliminates the very appearance-reality distinction that Nietzsche himself rejects. In this section, I discuss another aspect of the Theaetetus that is crucial for understanding Nietzsche’s own project. Specifically, I explain how Plato has Socrates appeal to a Heraclitean ontology to support (P) and the related denial of the distinction between appearance and reality. Although some commentators have found it hard to take seriously Plato’s attempt to attribute to Protagoras a secret Heraclitean doctrine in which everything is flux,364 I argue that (RP) is the key that links these two positions together.

If Plato were to have Socrates move directly from (T) and (P) to a Heraclitean flux doctrine, it would be nearly impossible to make any sense of how or why Protagoras would teach his students such principles as support for homo mensura. After all, what does a doctrine of change have to do with a denial of the appearance-reality distinction and the related claim that man is the measure of all things? Here, however, it is important to note that the secret doctrine also includes (RP) or the view, negatively stated, that “nothing is one in and of itself” (152d2–3).365 As noted above, Lee rightly holds (RP) to be the most important element of the secret doctrine because it ultimately provides support for the Protagorean principle that some (x) is (F) to a perceiver (a) only if (x) seems (F) to (a).366

Although I differ from Lee in that I see (RP) as a central feature of Heraclitus’ thought and so directly related to his theory of becoming,367 I still follow her in explaining why (RP) is introduced at this point in the dialogue. Although one might agree with Protagoras that if some (x) appears to (a) as (F), then (x) is (F) for (a), one still might wonder about the status of (x) if it does not appear to any perceiver at all. Specifically, one might wonder if (x) exists and has some of its properties independently of being perceived.368 In my mind, the introduction and application of (RP) to the perceptual sphere eliminates this possibility, thereby making man the measure of things that are and those that are not. Since everything exists and is what it is only in relationship to something else, which, at this juncture in the argument, means standing in relation to some perceiver, (x) must appear to some (a) in order for it to exist and have the properties it does.

By expanding (RP) to include the existence of things in the perceptual sphere, e.g., wine and wind, and not just their properties, e.g., red and cold, my reading runs the risk of committing Protagoras to a Berkeley-like idealism about material objects. Although Berkeley found deep affinities between his own philosophy and the position articulated in the Theaetetus,369 Plato has Socrates introduce the ontology of Heraclitean flux precisely because he wants to avoid such a reading.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.